Cited by

5 STATE v. VANSICKEL Decision of the Court Although this provision of our constitution may afford broader protection than the First Amendment, ¶ 36 n.5 (2012), Vansickel has not explained how or why this provision would invalidate § 13-2907.01.

–56, ¶¶ 7–8 (2012) (motion to dismiss); Banner Univ.

The court correctly dismissed the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) if, as a matter of law, “[P]laintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” ¶ 8 (2012) (quoting Fid.

¶ 9 (2012) (stating that “public records regarding matters referenced in a complaint[] are not ‘outside the 2 STEPHENS v. STATE Opinion of the Court pleading,’” and courts can consider them as part of the Rule 12(b)(6) mo

The court assumes “the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge[s] all reasonable inferences from those facts.” ¶ 9 (2012).

¶ 9 (2012) (“In determining if a complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences form those facts[.]”).

(whether judicial immunity applies is question of law reviewed de novo).

4 TOLIVER v. US BANK NATIONAL Decision of the Court to the pleading itself.” ¶ 9 (2012) (citation modified).

DISCUSSION ¶16 We review the superior court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo and assume “the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts.” –56, ¶¶ 7–9 (2012).

Dismissal is appropriate “under Rule 12(b)(6) only if as a matter of law plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible to proof.” ¶ 8 (2012) (cleaned up).

¶ 7 (2012) (motion to dismiss); ¶ 8 (2018) (rules).

XIV, § 1, we have construed our state provision “as applying the same standard as applies to equal protection claims under the [F]ederal [C]onstitution.” ¶ 39 (2012); Valley Nat’l Bank of Phx.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Because the superior court dismissed this matter pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we “assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts.” ¶ 9 (2012).

1 In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), we “assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts.” –56, ¶¶ 7, 9 (2012).

¶ 46 (2012) (“In adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss .