Cited by

-56, ¶¶ 7- 9 (2012) (dismissals); ¶ 12 (2003) (summary judgments).

5 STATE v. VANSICKEL Decision of the Court Although this provision of our constitution may afford broader protection than the First Amendment, ¶ 36 n.5 (2012), Vansickel has not explained how or why this provision would invalidate § 13-2907.01.

–56, ¶¶ 7–8 (2012) (motion to dismiss); Banner Univ.

“Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) only if as a matter of law plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” ¶ 8 (2012) (cleaned up).

of Regents, ¶ 7 (2020) ( ¶ 9 (2012)).

¶ 7 (2012); see Ariz. R. Civ.

The court correctly dismissed the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) if, as a matter of law, “[P]laintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” ¶ 8 (2012) (quoting Fid.

We “assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts, but mere conclusory statements are insufficient.” ¶ 9 (2012).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 On appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we presume the well-pleaded factual allegations are true and “indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts, but mere conclusory statements are insufficient.” ¶ 9 (2012).

“[M]ere conclusory statements are insufficient.” ¶ 9 (2012).

“Dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo.” ¶ 7 (2012).

ms. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 In reviewing the dismissal of a claim, this Court will “assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts,” and in reviewing a grant of summary judgment on a claim, this Court examines the facts “in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” ¶ 9 (2012); Read v. Phx.

¶ 9 (2012) (stating that “public records regarding matters referenced in a complaint[] are not ‘outside the 2 STEPHENS v. STATE Opinion of the Court pleading,’” and courts can consider them as part of the Rule 12(b)(6) mo

Dismissal is appropriate if the claimant is not “entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” ¶ 8 (2012).

The court assumes “the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge[s] all reasonable inferences from those facts.” ¶ 9 (2012).

¶ 9 (2012) (“In determining if a complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences form those facts[.]”).

(whether judicial immunity applies is question of law reviewed de novo).

4 TOLIVER v. US BANK NATIONAL Decision of the Court to the pleading itself.” ¶ 9 (2012) (citation modified).

DISCUSSION ¶16 We review the superior court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo and assume “the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts.” –56, ¶¶ 7–9 (2012).

Dismissal is appropriate “under Rule 12(b)(6) only if as a matter of law plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible to proof.” ¶ 8 (2012) (cleaned up).

¶ 7 (2012) (motion to dismiss); ¶ 8 (2018) (rules).

XIV, § 1, we have construed our state provision “as applying the same standard as applies to equal protection claims under the [F]ederal [C]onstitution.” ¶ 39 (2012); Valley Nat’l Bank of Phx.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Because the superior court dismissed this matter pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we “assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts.” ¶ 9 (2012).