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¶20 “[C]ommunity property is to be divided ‘equitably’ absent a sound reason otherwise appearing in the record.” ¶ 15 (App. 2019) ().

She contends that because OTS deeded the property to Wife as a married 4 ZECIC v. ZECIC Decision of the Court woman and not to the community, this case is unlike

Generally, community property “should be divided substantially equally unless sound reason exists to divide the property otherwise.”

Generally, “an equal distribution of joint property will be the most equitable.” (noting that determining whether a property division is equitable is “dependent upon the facts of particular cases”).

See Hatch, 113 Ariz. at 134; (there is sound reason for the superior court to divide property unequally in unique circumstances, such as when one spouse “paid for [the] property entirely from his separate funds” and “[t]he marriage lasted two weeks”).

The superior court is not “bound by any per se rule of equality,” but has “discretion to decide what is equitable in each case.”

In most cases, a substantially equal division is equitable unless there is “a sound reason to divide the property otherwise.” ¶ 6 (App. 2010)

“[T]he general principle [is] that all marital joint property should be divided substantially equally unless sound reason exists to divide the property otherwise.”

“‘Equitable’ means just that—it is a concept of fairness dependent upon the facts of particular cases.”

This “approach simply reflects the principle that community property implies equal ownership.”

Generally, the division must be “substantially equal[] unless sound reason exists to divide the property otherwise.”

Specifically, he argues that the court unfairly apportioned these assets to “punish” him for “misconduct.” ¶54 Recognizing that the superior court has substantial discretion to determine “what is equitable in each case,” we will uphold its division of community property absent a clear abuse of discretion, -23 (App. 1984).

¶13 “The touchstone of determining what is ‘equitable’ is a ‘concept of fairness dependent upon the facts of particular cases.’” ¶ 18 (App. 2010) ().

(stating the legislature intended that trial courts have broad discretion in deciding what is equitable in dissolution cases).