Cited by

¶ 7 (App. 2010) (the applicability of § 21-211 is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo), aff’d

.”) (emphasis added); ¶¶ 10, 14, 18 (2011) (prospective juror whose professional interest in case meet criteria under § 21-211(2), and thereby creates appearance of bias, must be disqualified “regardless of any juror-specific finding of actual bias”).

¶¶ 12, 15, 18 (App. 2010) (concluding that error in declining to strike juror who was “interested” in the case under Section 21-211 was subject to harmless-error review (quoting § 21-211(2))), aff’d

juror[] in any particular action.” This bar “serves at least three goals: (1) preserving the right to a fair trial by impartial jurors, (2) ensuring that jurors derive their knowledge about the case solely from information presented at trial to the jurors collectively, and (3) protecting the appearance of fairness, which helps instill public confidence in the judicial system.” see also Ariz. R. Crim.

¶10 “The right to a jury trial requires unbiased, impartial jurors.” ¶ 6 (2011) (citations omitted).

§ 21-211(2); ¶ 11 (2011).

§ 21-211 ”4 “[E]xcusing jurors is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court” and we will not set aside a court’s decision as to whether to strike a juror for cause “absent clear and prejudicial abuse of that discretion.” (App

¶ 9 (2011) (“[I]f the terms mean the same thing, then one subsection is redundant, and we generally construe statutes so that no part is rendered redundant or meaningless.”); see also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 174 (stating that no provision “should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicat

As noted by our supreme court, under certain circumstances, “[t]he potential for an appearance of bias suffice[s] to require disqualification regardless of any juror-specific finding of actual bias.” State v. Eddington (Eddington II), aff’g

Although a defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury, ¶ 6 (2011), Kemp waived the issue by failing to challenge the juror.

¶ 32 (2018) ("[A] juror who knows some of the people involved in a case is not automatically barred from serving on a jury."); ¶ 11 (2011) (discussing non-pecuniary interests requiring juror disqualification).

As an initial matter, the State argues that because Acuna did not use his peremptory strikes on these jurors, he failed to preserve this issue for review, aff’d on other grounds by

¶42 ¶¶ 11– 13, in which a deputy sheriff employed by the law enforcement agency that investigated the crime was disqualified from sitting on the jury because he was potentially interested in the outcome of the case.

1, ¶¶ 84-85, ¶¶ 65-69, -96 (2007).1 Although novel assignments of instruction-related error can sometimes rise to this level, we will grant appellate relief only in those rare cases where a defendant has made “[a] particular showing of prejudice.” aff’d, P.3d 1057 (2011).