Cited by

¶ 38 (App. 2024) ( ¶ 60 (2021)).

However, “a statute cannot circumvent or modify constitutional requirements.” ¶ 24 (2021).

When interpreting related provisions, we construe them in a way that gives effect to all provisions involved; we avoid interpretations that render provisions “meaningless, unnecessary, or duplicative.” Arizona Dep’t ¶ 10 (2008); ¶ 25 (2021) (“We also avoid interpreting a statute in a way that renders portions superfluous.”).

¶ 60 (2021) (“[W]e presume a word or phrase bears the same meaning throughout a text.”); State ex rel.

¶¶ 24-25 (2021) (recognizing it is the judiciary’s exclusive power to state what the law is and noting that language chosen by a statute’s proponents will neither bind nor limit the court’s determination of its meaning (citations omitted)).

Comm’n, ¶ 21 (App. 2008) (cleaned up); ¶ 60 (2021).

We, instead, presume that “a word or phrase bears the same meaning throughout a text.” ¶ 60 (2021).

at 164 ¶ 9; ¶ 15 (2021).

¶ 37 (2021) (–43 (1948)).

1, § 1(1); (“[T]he meaning of words in our constitution must be drawn from the context in which they are used and considered in light of the document as a whole.”).

¶11 “In interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions, we give words ’their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended.’” ¶ 25 (2021) (quoting Ariz. ex rel.

In doing so, “we give words ‘their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended.’” (quoting Arizona ex rel.

¶ 11 (2021) (“The ripeness doctrine prevents a court from rendering a premature judgment or opinion on a situation that may never occur.”) ().

he Secretary’s position that the 2019 EPM’s voting-center provisions constitute a duly adopted procedure that supplements, rather than contravenes, the relevant statutes, as expressly contemplated by § 16-602(B)’s statement that “[t]he hand count shall be conducted as prescribed by this section and in accordance with hand count procedures established by the secretary of state.” ¶ 11 (2021) (explaining that we exercise restraint to ensure that we do not issue advisory opinions or otherwise decide

We “presume a word or phrase bears the same meaning throughout a text.” ¶ 60 (2021).

¶ 16 (2021) (a plaintiff must demonstrate “irreparable injury” to obtain a preliminary injunction); Baldwin v. Ariz. Flame Rest., Inc., (an injunction must be tailored “to meet specific purposes which are established by the facts as violative of existing law”); Pure Wafer Inc. v. City of