Cited by

Substantial evidence is what “reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 40 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

-24, ¶¶ 22, 25 (App. 2007); see also 6 STATE v. ROWE Decision of the Court Steinman, 130 F.4th at 704.2 Rowe did not consent to a search, so the trooper had to have reasonable suspicion to continue the encounter.

Substantial evidence is that which “reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 40 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

“The officer must be able to articulate the reasons, ‘based on the totality of the circumstances,’ that suggest a traffic violation has occurred.” State v. Alvarez-Soto, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶ 10, ( ¶ 20 (App. 2007)).

¶15 We review the superior court’s denial of a Rule 20 motion and whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction de novo and will affirm “unless no substantial evidence supports the conviction.” ¶ 39 (App. 2007); ¶¶ 15-16 (2011).

“Although ‘reasonable suspicion’ must be more than an inchoate ‘hunch,’ the Fourth Amendment only requires that police articulate some minimal, objective justification for an investigatory detention.” ¶ 25 (App. 2007).

“The substantial evidence required to support a conviction may be direct or circumstantial,” ¶ 40 (App. 2007), and we do not “reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact,”

¶ 22 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

“The substantial evidence required to support a conviction may be direct or circumstantial.” ¶ 40 (App. 2007).

¶24 Shwar contends that Dickinson “lacked independent reasonable suspicion to extend” the initial traffic stop to investigate Garg “for [DUI] and possession of intoxicating drugs.” ¶25 “We undertake a two-step inquiry to determine the constitutionality of an investigative detention.” ¶ 27 (App. 2007).

¶7 We review the denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, “but we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact and the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusions” as to whether a search was lawful, ¶ 19 (App. 2007).

cting a routine traffic stop receives the driver’s valid driver’s license and proof of entitlement to operate the vehicle, the officer must let the driver leave without further delay or questioning unless (1) the traffic stop becomes consensual or (2) during the traffic stop “the officer gains a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in illegal activity.” ¶ 22 (App. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

¶ 22 (App. 2007) (prolonged traffic stop justified even after the driver shows valid registration if, during the stop, the officer gains a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” that criminal activity is afoot) (citation omitted); (extended vehicle search justified w

¶ 40 (App. 2007); Cox, 214 Ariz. at 520, ¶ 10.

“The substantial evidence required to support a conviction may be direct or circumstantial.” ¶ 40 (App. 2007).

Instead, this court defers “to the [superior] court’s factual findings, including findings on credibility and the reasonableness of the inferences drawn by the officer.” ¶ 19 (App. 2007).