Cited by

“We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence absent a clear abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice.” ¶ 24 (App. 2004) (citation omitted).

-56, ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (stating that appellate court presumes trial court considered all evidence presented); see also Toren C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 21- 0287, 2022 WL 872834 at *6, ¶ 25 (Ariz. App. Mar.

¶ 32 (App. 2004) (cleaned up).

(we presume the superior court knows the law and applies it when making decisions); –56 ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (we presume the court considered all the admissible evidence).

In re: MH2022-002881, 1 CA- MH 22-0042, at *3, ¶ 18 ( ¶¶ 28-29 (App. 2004) (finding no abuse of discretion when the superior court erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence because the evidence was “substantially cumulative” and did not prejudice the other party)).

–56, ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (we presume the court considered all evidence admitted).

-56, ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (citation omitted); ¶ 21 (App. 2011) (citation omitted) (holding that although the court did not discuss the evidence in detail, “we presume it fully considered the relevant evidence”).

Although the court did not expressly state whether the offer was more favorable, the court is presumed to know and correctly apply the law, and to consider all the evidence properly before it, ¶ 18 (App. 2004).

JH2K I treats “preschool” as of a piece with “primary or secondary school.” ¶73 Demonstrating the lack of ambiguity in the Act, we did not use secondary interpretive tools to parse Section 2802(B) in JH2K I. This shows we found Section 2802(B) unambiguous in treating “preschool” as a type of “school” containing “schoolchildren.” ¶ 12 (App. 2004) (“[W]hen the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court need not and should not resort to secondary rules of statutory construction.”); Chapar

¶ 16 (App. 2009); –56, ¶ 18 (App. 2004).

(citation omitted) (We presume the superior court knows the law and applies it when making decisions.); -56, ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (We presume the court considered all the admissible evidence.).

–56 ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (“Although the trial court’s signed minute entry does not specifically detail [the husband’s] financial situation, the foregoing evidence is presumed to have been fully considered by the court prior to issuing its decision.”).

¶ 18 (App. 2004) (as amended).

Sec., ¶ 8 (App. 2004); –56, ¶ 18 (App. 2004).

¶11 We review an order granting or denying post-decree relief for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 9 (App. 2022), which occurs if the court commits an error of law in exercising its discretion, ¶ 23 (App. 2004).

¶ 32 (App. 2004) (“[T]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions.” (citation omitted)).

¶ 18 (App. 2004) (stating that we presume that the court fully considered the evidence in the record in issuing the ruling, even if the ruling does not detail the relevant evidence considered).