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The challenging party cannot meet this burden merely by showing that a prospective juror had previously been a crime victim, ¶ 126 (2019), that the prospective juror’s “assurances of impartiality” were not “couched in absolute terms,” ¶ 37 (2000), or even that the prospective juror has “preconceived notions concerning the defendant’s guilt[,]”

E C K E R S T R O M, Judge, dissenting: ¶30 In assessing whether Juror 11 should have been disqualified, we must start with the premise that she honestly believed she could act as a fair and impartial juror.4 (“[T]he trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and thereby judge the credibility of each.”).

at 174 ¶ 51 ( ¶ 48 (2000)).

¶ 66 (2000) (finding error was harmless because “all aspects of [the witness’s] prior statements were included in [his] own testimony” and the witness was subject to cross-examination).

¶ 66 (2000) (citation omitted) (holding that any error in admitting evidence of witness Nelson’s prior consistent statements was harmless “because all aspects of Nelson’s prior statements were included in Nelson’s own testimony, and Nelson was subjected to thorough cross-examination”).

¶ 91 (2014); ¶ 78 (2000).

¶ 97 (2000) (explaining the superior court “is in the best position to evaluate credibility and accuracy, as well as draw inferences, weigh, and balance”) (quotation and citation omitted); (“It is the duty of the [superior] court to resolve any conflicts in the evid

¶ 97 (2000) (citations omitted).

But because the trial court is in the best position to determine an impaneled juror’s fairness and impartiality, a defendant “challenging the juror bears the burden of establishing” the juror’s bias or discrimination, ¶ 37 (2000).

¶31 “In assessing a potential juror’s fairness and impartiality, the trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and thereby judge the credibility of each.” ¶ 37 (2000).

¶ 48 (2000) (“Prejudice will not be presumed but must appear affirmatively from the record.”).

The trial judge is in the best position to assess a juror’s credibility, ¶ 37 (2000), and the court has broad discretion when enforcing this rule, ¶ 17 (App. 2010).

¶ 24 (2000) ("Even assuming a Miranda violation, non-reference to the statements at trial renders defendant's Miranda objections moot."); (noting that a defendant is not prejudiced when the State does not make reference at trial to improperly obtained state

“In assessing a potential juror’s fairness and impartiality, the trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and thereby judge the credibility of each.” ¶ 37 (2000).

¶5 “In assessing a potential juror’s fairness and impartiality, the trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and thereby judge the credibility of each.”

–43 (2000) (“We will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence without a ‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted.” (citation omitted)).

¶ 66 (2000) (concluding that any error in admitting a prior consistent statement was harmless where the statement was cumulative of other evidence and the declarant “was subjected to thorough cross- examination”), abrogation on other grounds recognized by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 815 (9th Cir. 2015).

See Newell, 212 Ariz. at 404, ¶ 69; ¶ 48 (2000) (“Prejudice will not be presumed but must appear affirmatively from the record.”).

¶17 “A police officer has probable cause when reasonably trustworthy information and circumstance would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense.” –38 ¶ 30 (2000).

¶ 58 (2000) (noting fingerprints and possession of a victim’s property is “strong” evidence of guilt).

¶18 It is well settled in Arizona that polygraph evidence is unreliable and, absent a stipulation by the parties, categorically inadmissible at trial “for any purpose.” (explaining polygraph evidence inadmissible “because it is unreliable and the trier of fact has a tendency to treat such evidence as conclusive on the issue of guilt”); (finding evidence of or reference to polygr

requires a search warrant be issued only upon probable cause.”); -38, ¶ 30 (2000) (“A police officer has probable cause when reasonably trustworthy information and circumstance would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense.”).

Probable cause is defined as “when reasonably trustworthy information and circumstance would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed an offense.” –38, ¶ 30 (2000).

See, ¶ 28 (2000); Bailey, 160 Ariz. at 280.

404(b), courts “will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence” unless there is a “‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted,” –43 ¶ 57 (2000) (citation omitted).

“Prejudice will not be presumed but must appear affirmatively from the record.” ¶ 48 (2000).

¶ 75 (2000) ("[W]hen the substance of a proposed instruction is adequately covered by other instructions, the superior court is not required to give it.").

¶ 66 (2000) (finding the admission of an alleged hearsay statement to be harmless when declarant testified to the statement and was cross-examined).

And “a juror’s assurances of impartiality need not be couched in absolute terms.” ¶ 37 (2000).

“The party challenging the juror bears the burden of establishing that the juror could not be fair and impartial.” ¶ 37, (2000), supplemented on other grounds

We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion, bearing in mind “the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate ‘the atmosphere of the trial, the manner in which the objectionable statement was made, and the possible effect it had on the jury and the trial.’” ¶ 18 (2010) ( ¶ 52 (2000), ).

Thus, there is no reasonable probability the verdict would have been different had the character evidence not been admitted, -43, ¶ 57 (2000), and any error in admitting the evidence was harmless.

¶ 100 (2000) (rejecting defendant’s argument that he was a minor participant because the jury found that he committed premeditated murder and thus concluded that defendant was a major participant in the murder beyond a reasonable doubt).

¶ 44 (2000), supplemented

P. 18.4(b); ¶ 37 (2000).

Because polygraph examinations are considered “unreliable,” Arizona law is well-settled that absent a stipulation, any reference to a polygraph test is “inadmissible for any purpose[.]” ¶ 69 (2000).

State v. Hoskins , , ¶ 75