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¶17 Father’s claims fail because Rule 35(c) allows the superior court to “decide motions without oral argument, even if requested.” A hearing is not required unless a “material contested issue hinges on credibility,” ¶ 14 (App. 2014), or the parties “are directly in opposition upon any substantial and crucial fact relevant to the [issue],”

The court has broad discretion to control all proceedings, including the presentation of witnesses and evidence, ¶¶ 19-20 (App. 2014); Ariz. R. Evid.

¶ 26 (App. 2014) (holding due process errors warrant reversal only if prejudice is shown).

¶ 14 (App. 2014) (“[D]ue process requires the court to allow parties a reasonable opportunity to present testimony whenever resolution of a material contested issue hinges on credibility.”).

¶14 Due process requires “an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” and “an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” 469, ¶¶ 20, 24 (App. 2014) (citation modified).

efficient but adequate cross- examination.” ¶ 21 (App. 2014).

¶ 20 (App. 2014) (Due process requires the court to “afford the parties an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (quotation omitted)).

“Due process errors require reversal only if a party is thereby prejudiced.” ¶ 26 (App. 2014) (citation omitted).

5 CARDONA v. IVORY Decision of the Court matters of credibility on documents alone.” ¶ 2 (App. 2014).

Although the court may impose time limits, time limits violate due process if they prove “insufficient to allow a substantive hearing.” ¶ 21 (App. 2014).

Due process requires that the court “afford the parties an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” ¶ 20 (App. 2014) (citation and internal quotation omitted).

“Due process errors require reversal only if a party is thereby prejudiced.” ¶ 26 (App. 2014).

Although Mother “did not object with the ‘magic words’ of due process, [s]he implicitly raised the same arguments below that [s]he now presents on [appeal] and therefore adequately preserved the issue for our review.” ¶ 22 n.6 (App. 2014).

True, the court’s discretion to set time limits in trial must still be exercised consistent with the requirements of due process, which include the parties’ right to have “a reasonable opportunity to present testimony.” ¶ 14 (App. 2014).

“But the court’s discretion is not limitless and cannot be exercised unreasonably.” ¶ 20 (App. 2014).

¶22 That is not to say the Danforths were entitled to an evidentiary hearing.5 A court must hold an evidentiary hearing when “resolution of a material contested issue hinges on credibility.” ¶ 14 (App. 2014).

See, (“Due process errors require reversal only if a party is thereby prejudiced.”).

–69, ¶¶ 19–22 (App. 2014).

The 10-day rule exists because “[d]ue process entitles a party to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” ¶ 16 (App. 2006); ¶ 21 (App. 2014) (“When the court allows no time to hear testimony, or when the time available for each necessary witness does not allow for meaningful direct testimony and efficient but adequate cross-examination, the court violates the parties’ due process rights.”).

¶ 15 (App. 2014) (noting that due process requires that litigants be given an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner on “the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important”) (citation omitted).

¶ 26 (App. 2014) (“Due process errors require reversal only if a party is thereby prejudiced.”).