Cited by

Laveen Meadows Homeowners Ass’n v. Mejia, ¶ 10 (App. 2020).

(concluding “we are not disposed to assume that the trial court exercised its discretion” when court fails to explain its decision and none are apparent from the record); see also Emeofa v. Emeofa, 1 CA-CV 24-0805, 2025 WL 3140192, at *3 ¶ 17 (Nov.

Ordinarily, we would affirm “where any reasonable view of the facts and law might support the judgment of the trial court.” see also McAlister v. Loeb & Loeb, LLP, ¶ 49 (2025) (affirming superior court’s entry of summary judgment on other grounds).

see also Copeland v. Ariz. Veterans Mem’l Coliseum & Exposition Ctr.

Indeed, the superior court is generally “not required to give reasons for discretionary rulings,” n.3 (1985), and the “grant or denial of post-conviction relief is within the [superior] court’s discretion,”

(examining the record to determine whether grounds exist to support the court’s decision, even if the trial court reached the right result for the wrong reason).

In exercising its discretion, however, a court must be mindful of the “compelling interest in the finality of judgments which should not be lightly disregarded.” (citation modified); ¶ 11 (1999) (“A judgment is a solemn record[,]” and “[i]t should not lightly be disturbed.” (citation omitted)).

¶10 CEC argues the superior court erred in denying its request for relief from the entry of judgment based on Rule 60(b)(6).2 The denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 8 (2018), and will be affirmed unless undisputed facts and circumstances require a different ruling

(holding that when the trial court identifies “[n]o grounds for its action .

Ultimately, “[d]iligence is the ‘final arbiter of whether mistake or neglect is excusable.’” ¶ 15 (App. 2022) ().

¶ 8 (App. 2012) (citation omitted) (noting that a court abuses its discretion by “making a discretionary ruling that the record does not support”); (holding when the trial court identifies “[n]o grounds for its action .

(recognizing that we are obliged to "affirm where any reasonable view of the facts and law might support the judgment of the trial court"); Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz.App.

We "affirm where any reasonable view of the facts and law might support the judgment," City of Phoenix v. 3 and "review any legal questions de novo," ¶ 5 (App. 2014).

A party’s neglect is excusable when it “might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.”

1 see also Copeland v. Ariz. Veterans Mem’l Coliseum & Exposition Ctr., (stating that we reverse a superior court’s order denying relief under Rule 60 for an abuse of 1City of Phoenix v. Geyler discusses Rule 60(c), but Rule 60(c) is now modified as Rule 60(b).

But a party’s mere neglect or forgetfulness does not entitle him to relief, Aloia, 252 Ariz. at 552, ¶ 15, and “diligence is the final arbiter of whether mistake or neglect is excusable,”

Grp., ¶ 22 (App. 2008) ().

We review the court's denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion, and "affirm where any reasonable view of the facts and law might support the judgment,"

Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Ass’n, ¶ 22 (App. 2018)