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“[I]f reasonable evidence and inferences” support the court’s findings, this Court “will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 579, ¶ 10 ( ¶ 9 (2016)).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 This Court views the facts “in a light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s findings.” ¶ 2 (2016).

-5, ¶¶ 13, 16-17 (2016).

¶ 15 (2016) (citing cases).

Ultimately, the court’s primary concern during the best-interests inquiry is “protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.” ¶ 15 (2016) (citation modified).

And it is well-established in State-initiated cases that the child’s prospective adoption may serve a benefit supporting a best-interests determination, ¶ 12 (2016), so long as the court considers the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance, Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150-51, ¶ 13.

Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13; ¶ 16 (2016) (recognizing that because this standard is “[f]ramed in the disjunctive,” a best interests finding may be supported by either).

Thus, we accept its factual findings “if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.” ¶ 9 (2016).

The court may find a benefit from termination if there is an adoption plan, or if the child is “adoptable.” –4 ¶ 12 (2016).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 This Court views the facts “in a light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s findings.” ¶ 2 (2016).

Best Interests ¶22 We view “the record in the light most favorable to upholding the court’s best-interests finding,” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 152, ¶ 21, and will “accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.” ¶ 9 (2016).

-4 ¶ 12; Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

¶ 16 (2016) (citing Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ.

¶ 16 (2016) (citations omitted).

¶7 “[W]e accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them,” ¶ 9 (2016), and will only overturn the court’s finding of sufficient evidence supporting a statutory factor if “no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing,” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, -79, ¶ 31 (2023) (quotation omitted); A.R.

See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 149 ¶ 8 ( ¶ 15 (2016)); see also Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 12 (2020).

at 148, 150–51, ¶¶ 1, 13; – 4, ¶ 12 (2016).

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” “Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility,” we must accept its factual findings if they are supported by “reasonable evidence and inferences.” ¶ 9 (2016).