Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Marriage of MacMillan v. Schwartz, 250 P.3d 1213.

245 citing documents.

  • Kaltz v. Kaltz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • SHOLI v. STATE Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Varela v. Hauser Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    See 10 ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (holding that “[m]erely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient,” and therefore appellant waived argument that was not supported by argument or authority).
  • STROLE v. FAIRGROUNDS Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    Although we could treat every issue as waived on that basis, ¶ 33 (App. 2011), in our discretion, we address the arguments we can identify, specifically, that the superior court erred in entering the judgment of dismissal with prejudice.
  • In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    Decision of the Court Schwartz, ¶ 33 (App. 2011); ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A).
  • In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.W. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.”).
  • Edmark v. Szynklarz-Edmark Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    The superior court “is in the best position to observe and assess the conduct of the parties before it.” ¶ 38 (App. 2011).
  • Robinson v. Robinson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.”).
  • Wood v. Drapkin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011); ¶ 5 n.2 (App. 2015).
  • Hancock v. Martinez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Hancock v. Martinez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011); ¶ 5 n.2 (App. 2015).
  • Mapes v. Mapes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Mapes v. Mapes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    v. Ball, ¶ 16 (App. 2022) (“[W]e construe ambiguous contract provisions against the drafter.”); ¶ 15 (App. 2011) (A property settlement agreement that is incorporated, but not merged, into a dissolution decree “retains its independent contractual status and is subject to the rights and limitations of contract law.”).
  • Tanner v. Clymer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Tanner v. Clymer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Abasciano v. Abasciano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Abasciano v. Abasciano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Gipson v. Shinnink Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Gipson v. Shinnink Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    See Odom, 216 Ariz. at 535 ¶ 18; ¶ 33 (App. 2011).
  • Thompson v. Spina Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Thompson v. Spina Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    “Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.” ¶ 33 (App. 2011).
  • In Re the Marriage of Wichansky Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
  • In Re the Marriage of Wichansky Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
  • In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.B. and C.B. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.B. and C.B. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (citation omitted).
  • Kuerschner v. Kuerschner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Kuerschner v. Kuerschner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.” (citation omitted)).
  • Redding v. Southeast Valley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Redding v. Southeast Valley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Howie v. Howie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Howie v. Howie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    -90, ¶ 20-21 (App. 2011) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in treating payments by employer into deferred compensation plan as employee’s income for spousal maintenance purposes); ¶ 6 (1999) (noting that, when determining child support, court may
  • Polich v. Polich Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Polich v. Polich Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Rhoads v. Adot Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Rhoads v. Adot Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.”).
  • Danam v. Gcu Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Danam v. Gcu Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.”); see also Schabel v. Deer Valley Unified Sch.
  • Luque v. Ocampo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Luque v. Ocampo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    Moreover, “[m]erely mentioning an argument in an appellate brief is insufficient.” ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (citing cases).
  • Danko v. Ameika Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Danko v. Ameika Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.”).
  • Pedroza v. Pedroza Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Pedroza v. Pedroza Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    “Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.” ¶ 33 (App. 2011).
  • Finchem v. Fontes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Finchem v. Fontes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.”).
  • Danko v. Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Danko v. Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    DANKO v. JACKSON Decision of the Court ¶18 Nonetheless, because “resolution of cases on their merits is preferred,” ¶ 9 (App. 2013), we will, in the exercise of our discretion, address the substance of the arguments presented to the extent they are developed sufficiently for us to do so, ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is insufficient.”).
  • Talking Rock v. Inscription Canyon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Talking Rock v. Inscription Canyon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Opening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth the appellant’s position on the issues raised;” a failure to do so “constitutes abandonment and a waiver”) (citations omitted); Schabel v. Deer Valley Unified Sch.
  • Stoney v. Stoney Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024